西安工业大学北方信息工程学院
毕业设计(论文)外文翻译资料
系 别 管理信息系 专 业 财务管理 班 级 B080510 姓 名 郭 静 学 号 B******** 导 师 王化中
Optimal Capital Structure: Reflections on economic and other values
By Marc Schauten & Jaap Spronk1 1. Introduction
Despite a vast literature on the capital structure of the firm (see Harris and Raviv, 1991, Graham and Harvey, 2001, Brav et al., 2005, for overviews) there still is a big gap between theory and practice (see e.g. Cools, 1993, Tempelaar, 1991, Boot & Cools, 1997). Starting with the seminal work by Modigliani & Miller (1958, 1963), much attention has been paid to the optimality of capital structure from the shareholders’ point of view.
Over the last few decades studies have been produced on the effect of other
stakeholders’ interests on capital structure. Well-known examples are the interests of customers who receive product or service guarantees from the company (see e.g. Grinblatt & Titman, 2002). Another area that has received considerable attention is the relation between managerial incentives and capital structure (Ibid.). Furthermore, the issue of corporate control2 (see Jensen & Ruback, 1983) and, related, the issue of corporate governance3 (see Shleifer & Vishney, 1997), receive a lion’s part of the more recent academic attention for capital structure decisions.
From all these studies, one thing is clear: The capital structure decision (or
rather, the management of the capital structure over time) involves more issues than the maximization of the firm’s market value alone. In this paper, we give an overview of the different objectives and considerations that have been proposed in the literature. We make a distinction between two broadly defined situations. The first is the traditional case of the firm that strives for the maximization of the value of the shares for the current shareholders. Whenever other considerations than value maximization enter capital structure decisions, these considerations have to be instrumental to the goal of value maximization. The second case concerns the firm that explicitly chooses for more objectives than value maximization alone. This may be because the shareholders adopt a multiple stakeholders approach or because of a different ownership structure than the usual corporate structure dominating finance literature. An example of the latter is the co-operation, a legal entity which can be found in a.o. many European countries. For a discussion on why firms are facing multiple goals, we refer to Hallerbach and Spronk (2002a, 2002b).
In Section 2 we will describe objectives and considerations that, directly or
indirectly, clearly help to create and maintain a capital structure which is 'optimal' for the value maximizing firm. The third section describes other objectives and considerations. Some of these may have a clear negative effect on economic value, others may be neutral and in some cases the effect on economic value is not always completely clear. Section 4 shows how, for both cases, capital structure decisions can be framed as multiple criteria decision problems which can then benefit from multiple criteria decision support tools that are now widely available. 2. Maximizing shareholder value
According to the neoclassical view on the role of the firm, the firm has one single objective: maximization of shareholder value. Shareholders possess the property rights of the firm and are thus entitled to decide what the firm should aim for. Since shareholders only have one objective in mind - wealth maximization - the goal of the firm is maximization of the firm's contribution to the financial wealth of its shareholders. The firm can accomplish this by investing in projects with positive net present value4. Part of shareholder value is determined by the corporate financing decision5. Two theories about the capital structure of the firm - the trade-off theory and the pecking order theory - assume shareholder wealth maximization as the one and only corporate objective. We will discuss both theories including several market value related extensions. Based on this discussion we formulate a list of criteria that is relevant for the corporate financing decision in this essentially neoclassical view. The original proposition I of Miller and Modigliani (1958) states that in a perfect capital market the equilibrium market value of a firm is independent of its capital structure, i.e. the debt-equity ratio6. If proposition I does not hold then arbitrage will take place. Investors will buy shares of the undervalued firm and sell shares of the overvalued shares in such a way that identical income streams are obtained. As investors exploit these arbitrage opportunities, the price of the overvalued shares will fall and that of the undervalued shares will rise, until both prices are equal.
When corporate taxes are introduced, proposition I changes dramatically. Miller and Modigliani (1958, 1963) show that in a world with corporate tax the value of firms is a.o. a function of leverage. When interest payments become tax deductible and payments to shareholders are not, the capital structure that maximizes firm value involves a hundred percent debt financing. By increasing leverage, the payments to the government are reduced with a higher cash flow for the providers of capital as a result. The difference between the present value of the taxes paid by an unlevered firm (G)
u
and an identical levered firm (G) is the present value of tax shields (PVTS). Figure 1
l
depicts the total value of an unlevered and a levered firm7. The higher leverage, the lower G, the higher G- G(=PVTS).
l
u
l
In the traditional trade-off models of optimal capital structure it is assumed that firms balance the marginal present value of interest tax shields8 against marginal direct costs of financial distress or direct bankruptcy costs.9 Additional factors can be included in this trade-off framework. Other costs than direct costs of financial distress are agency costs of debt (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Often cited examples of agency costs of debt are the underinvestment problem (Myers, 1977)10, the asset substitution problem (Jensen & Meckling, 1976 and Galai & Masulis, 1976), the 'play for time' game by managers, the 'unexpected increase of leverage (combined with an equivalent pay out to stockholders to make to increase the impact)', the 'refusal to contribute equity capital' and the 'cash in and run' game (Brealey, Myers & Allan, 2006). These problems are caused by the difference of interest between equity and debt holders and could be seen as part of the indirect costs of financial distress. Another benefit of debt
is the reduction of agency costs between managers and external equity (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Jensen, 1986, 1989). Jensen en Meckling (1976) argue that debt, by allowing larger managerial residual claims because the need for external equity is reduced by the use of debt, increases managerial effort to work. In addition, Jensen (1986) argues that high leverage reduces free cash with less resources to waste on unprofitable investments as a result.11 The agency costs between management and external equity are often left out the trade-off theory since it assumes managers not acting on behalf of the shareholders (only) which is an assumption of the traditional trade-off theory.
In Myers' (1984) and Myers and Majluf's (1984) pecking order model12 there is no optimal capital structure. Instead, because of asymmetric information and signalling problems associated with external financing13, firm's financing policies follow a hierarchy, with a preference for internal over external finance, and for debt over equity. A strict interpretation of this model suggests that firms do not aim at a target debt ratio. Instead, the debt ratio is just the cumulative result of hierarchical financing over time. (See Shyum-Sunder & Myers, 1999.) Original examples of signalling models are the models of Ross (1977) and Leland and Pyle (1977). Ross (1977) suggests that higher financial leverage can be used by managers to signal an optimistic future for the firm and that these signals cannot be mimicked by unsuccessful firms14. Leland and Pyle (1977) focus on owners instead of managers. They assume that entrepreneurs have better information on the expected cash flows than outsiders have. The inside information held by an entrepreneur can be transferred to suppliers of capital because it is in the owner's interest to invest a greater fraction of his wealth in successful projects. Thus the owner's willingness to invest in his own projects can serve as a signal of project quality. The value of the firm increases with the percentage of equity held by the entrepreneur relative to the percentage he would have held in case of a lower quality project. (Copeland, Weston & Shastri, 2005.)
The stakeholder theory formulated by Grinblatt & Titman (2002)15 suggests that the way in which a firm and its non-financial stakeholders interact is an important determinant of the firm's optimal capital structure. Non-financial stakeholders are those parties other than the debt and equity holders. Non-financial stakeholders include firm's customers, employees, suppliers and the overall community in which the firm operates. These stakeholders can be hurt by a firm's financial difficulties. For example customers may receive inferior products that are difficult to service, suppliers may lose business, employees may lose jobs and the economy can be disrupted. Because of the costs they potentially bear in the event of a firm's financial distress, non-financial stakeholders will be less interested ceteris paribus in doing business with a firm having a high(er) potential for financial difficulties. This understandable reluctance to do business with a distressed firm creates a cost that can deter a firm from undertaking excessive debt financing even when lenders are willing to provide it on favorable terms (Ibid., p. 598). These considerations by non-financial stakeholders are the cause of their importance as determinant for the capital structure. This stakeholder theory could be seen as part of the trade-off theory (see Brealey, Myers and Allen, 2006, p.481, although the term 'stakeholder theory' is not mentioned) since these
stakeholders influence the indirect costs of financial distress.16
As the trade-off theory (excluding agency costs between managers and shareholders) and the pecking order theory, the stakeholder theory of Grinblatt and Titman (2002) assumes shareholder wealth maximization as the single corporate objective.17
Based on these theories, a huge number of empirical studies have been produced. See e.g. Harris & Raviv (1991) for a systematic overview of this literature18. More recent studies are e.g. Shyum-Sunder & Myers (1999), testing the trade-off theory against the pecking order theory, Kemsley & Nissim (2002) estimating the present value of tax shield, Andrade & Kaplan (1998) estimating the costs of financial distress and Rajan & Zingales (1995) investigating the determinants of capital structure in the G-7 countries. Rajan & Zingales (1995)19 explain differences in leverage of individual firms with firm characteristics. In their study leverage is a function of tangibility of assets, market to book ratio, firm size and profitability. Barclay & Smith (1995) provide an empirical examination of the determinants of corporate debt maturity. Graham & Harvey (2001) survey 392 CFOs about a.o. capital structure. We come back to this Graham & Harvey study in Section 3.20
Cross sectional studies as by Titman and Wessels (1988), Rajan & Zingales (1995) and Barclay & Smith (1995) and Wald (1999) model capital structure mainly in terms of leverage and then leverage as a function of different firm (and market) characteristics as suggested by capital structure theory21. We do the opposite. We do not analyze the effect of several firm characteristics on capital structure (c.q. leverage), but we analyze the effect of capital structure on variables that co-determine shareholder value. In several decisions, including capital structure decisions, these variables may get the role of decision criteria. Criteria which are related to the trade-off and pecking order theory are listed in Table 1. We will discuss these criteria in more detail in section 4. Figure 2 illustrates the basic idea of our approach. 3. Other objectives and considerations
A lot of evidence suggests that managers act not only in the interest of the
shareholders (see Myers, 2001). Neither the static trade-off theory nor the pecking order theory can fully explain differences in capital structure. Myers (2001, p.82) states that 'Yet even 40 years after the Modigliani and Miller research, our understanding of these firms22 financing choices is limited.' Results of several surveys (see Cools 1993, Graham & Harvey, 2001, Brounen et al., 2004) reveal that CFOs do not pay a lot of attention to variables relevant in these shareholder wealth maximizing theories. Given the results of empirical research, this does not come as a surprise. The survey by Graham and Harvey finds only moderate evidence for the trade-off theory. Around 70% have a flexible target or a somewhat tight target or range. Only 10% have a strict target ratio. Around 20% of the firms declare not to have an optimal or target debt-equity ratio at all.
In general, the corporate tax advantage seems only moderately important in capital structure decisions. The tax advantage of debt is most important for large regulated and dividend paying firms. Further, favorable foreign tax treatment relative to the US is fairly important in issuing foreign debt decisions23. Little evidence is found that personal taxes influence the capital structure24. In general potential costs of financial
distress seem not very important although credit ratings are. According to Graham and Harvey this last finding could be viewed as (an indirect) indication of concern with distress. Earnings volatility also seems to be a determinant of leverage, which is consistent with the prediction that firms reduce leverage when the probability of bankruptcy is high. Firms do not declare directly that (the present value of the expected) costs of financial distress are an important determinant of capital structure, although indirect evidence seems to exist. Graham and Harvey find little evidence that firms discipline managers by increasing leverage. Graham and Harvey explicitly note that ‘1) managers might be unwilling to admit to using debt in this manner, or 2) perhaps a low rating on this question reflects an unwillingness of firms to adopt Jensen’s solution more than a weakness in Jensen’s argument'.
The most important issue affecting corporate debt decisions is management’s desire for financial flexibility (excess cash or preservation of debt capacity). Furthermore, managers are reluctant to issue common stock when they perceive the market is undervalued (most CFOs think their shares are undervalued). Because asymmetric information variables have no power to predict the issue of new debt or equity, Harvey and Graham conclude that the pecking order model is not the true model of the security choice25.
The fact that neoclassical models do not (fully) explain financial behavior could be explained in several ways. First, it could be that managers do strive for creating shareholder value but at the same time also pay attention to variables other than the variables listed in Table 1. Variables of which managers think that they are (justifiably or not) relevant for creating shareholder value. Second, it could be that managers do not (only) serve the interest of the shareholders but of other stakeholders as well26. As a result, managers integrate variables that are relevant for them and or other stakeholders in the process of managing the firm's capital structure. The impact of these variables on the financing decision is not per definition negative for shareholder value. For example if ‘value of financial rewards for managers’ is one the goals that is maximized by managers – which may not be excluded – and if the rewards of managers consists of a large fraction of call options, managers could decide to increase leverage (and pay out an excess amount of cash, if any) to lever the volatility of the shares with an increase in the value of the options as a result. The increase of leverage could have a positive effect on shareholder wealth (e.g. the agency costs between equity and management could be lower) but the criterion 'value of financial rewards' could (but does not have to) be leading. Third, shareholders themselves do possibly have other goals than shareholder wealth creation alone. Fourth, managers rely on certain (different) rules of thumb or heuristics that do not harm shareholder value but can not be explained by neoclassical models either27. Fifth, the neoclassical models are not complete or not tested correctly (see e.g. Shyum-Sunder & Myers, 1999).
Either way, we do expect variables other than those founded in the neoclassical
property rights view are or should be included explicitly in the financing decision framework. To determine which variables should be included we probably need other views or theories of the firm than the neoclassical alone. Zingales (2000) argues that ‘…corporate finance theory, empirical research, practical implications, and policy
recommendations are deeply rooted in an underlying theory of the firm.’ (Ibid., p. 1623.) Examples of attempts of new theories are 'the stakeholder theory of the firm' (see e.g. Donaldson and Preston, 1995), 'the enlightened stakeholder theory' as a response (see Jensen, 2001), 'the organizational theory' (see Myers, 1993, 2000, 2001) and the stakeholder equity model (see Soppe, 2006).
We introduce an organizational balance sheet which is based on the organizational theory of Myers (1993). The intention is to offer a framework to enhance a discussion about criteria that could be relevant for the different stakeholders of the firm. In Myers' organizational theory employees (including managers) are included as stakeholders; we integrate other stakeholders as suppliers, customers and the community as well. Figure 3 presents the adjusted organizational balance sheet.
Pre-tax value is the maximum value of the firm including the maximum value of the present value of all stakeholders' surplus. The present value of the stakeholders' surplus (ES plus OTS) is the present value of future costs of perks, overstaffing, above market prices for inputs (including above market wages), above market services provided to customers and the community etc.28 Depending on the theory of the firm, the pre-tax value can be distributed among the different stakeholders following certain 'rules'. Note that what we call 'surplus' in this framework is still based on the 'property rights' principle of the firm. Second, only distributions in market values are reflected in this balance sheet. Neutral mutations are not29.
Based on the results of Graham and Harvey (2001) and common sense we formulate a list of criteria or heuristics that could be integrated into the financing decision framework. Some criteria lead to neutral mutations others do not. We call these criteria 'quasi non-economic criteria'. Non-economic, because the criteria are not based on the neoclassical view. Quasi, because the relations with economic value are not always clear cut. We include criteria that lead to neutral mutations as well, because managers might have good reasons that we overlook or are relevant for other reasons than financial wealth.
The broadest decision framework we propose in this paper is the one that includes both the economic and quasi non-economic variables. Figure 4 illustrates the idea. The additional quasi non-economic variables are listed in Table 2. This list is far from complete.
flexibility could be relevant for at least employees and the suppliers of resources needed for these projects. As long as managers only would invest in zero net present value projects this variable would have no value effect in the organizational balance sheet. But if it influences the value of the sum of the projects undertaken this will be reflected in this balance sheet. Of course, financial flexibility is also valued for economic reasons, see Section 2 and 4.
The probability of bankruptcy influences job security for employees and the duration of a 'profitable' relationship with the firm for suppliers, customers and possibly the community. For managers (and other stakeholders without diversified portfolios) the probability of default could be important. The cost of bankruptcy is for them possibly much higher than for shareholders with diversified portfolios. As with financial flexibility, the probability of default influences shareholder value as well. In Section 2
and 4 we discuss this variable in relation to shareholder value. Here the variable is relevant, because it has an effect on the wealth or other 'valued' variables of stakeholders other than equity (and debt) holders. We assume owner-managers dislike sharing control of their firms with others. For that reason, debt financing could possibly have non-economic advantages for these managers. After all, common stock carries voting rights while debt does not. Owner-managers might prefer debt over new equity to keep control over the firm. Control is relevant in the economic framework as well, see Section 2 and 4.
In practice, earnings dilution is an important variable effecting the financing decision. Whether it is a neutral mutations variable or not30, the effect of the financing decision on the earnings per share is often of some importance. If a reduction in the earnings per share (EPS) is considered to be a bad signal, managers try to prevent such a reduction. Thus the effect on EPS becomes an economic variable. As long as it is a neutral mutation variable, or if it is relevant for other reasons we treat EPS as a quasi non-economic variable.
The reward package could be relevant for employees. If the financing decision influences the value of this package this variable will be one of the relevant criteria for the manager. If it is possible to increase the value of this package, the influence on shareholder value is ceteris paribus negative. If the reward package motivates the manager to create extra shareholder value compared with the situation without the package, this would possibly more than offset this negative financing effect.
优化资本结构：思考经济和其他价值
By Marc Schauten & Jaap Spronk1
1。介绍
尽管有大量文献对公司的资本结构（见哈里斯和拉维夫，1991年，格雷厄姆和哈维，2001年，Brav等人，2005年，为概述）仍然是一个理论和实践之间的差距较大（如冷却， 1993年，1991年，Tempelaar，引导和冷却，1997年）。莫迪利亚尼和米勒（1958年，1963年）开始，开创性的工作，备受关注已支付的最优资本结构，从股东的角度来看。 在过去的几十年的研究已经生产上的其他利益相关者的利益对资本结构的影响。众所周知的例子是客户的利益，谁收到来自该公司的产品或服务的担保（见如Grinblatt和Titman，2002）。已经收到了相当的关注的另一个领域是管理的激励机制和资本结构“（同上）之间的关系。此外，企业control2问题（见詹森及Ruback，1983），有关企业governance3的问题（见施莱弗和Vishney，1997年），收到一个狮子的资本结构决策更近的学术界的关注 所有这些研究中，有一件事是明确的：资本结构的决定（或更确切地说，随着时间的推移资本结构的管理）涉及公司的市值仅比最大化的问题。在本文中，我们给不同的目标，并已在文献中提出的考虑的概述。我们两个广泛的定义的情况之间的区别。首先是传统的公司，现有股东的股份价值最大化的努力情况。其他因素比价值最大化每当进入资本结构的决定，这些因素是价值最大化的目标。第二宗个案涉及的坚定，明确地选择比单靠价值最大化的目标。这可能是因为股东采取多个利益相关者方法，或因支配财政文学的结构比一般的企业不同的所有制结构。后者的一个例子是合作，一个法人实体，可以发现在AO许多欧洲国家。为什么企业都面临着多重目标的讨论，我们是指到Hallerbach和Spronk（2002年a，2002年b）。
我们将在第2节描述，直接或间接，显然有助于建立和保持资本结构，这是“最佳”的价值最大化公司的目标和注意事项。第三部分介绍了其他的目标和考虑。其中有些可能有一个明确的经济价值的负面影响，其他人可能是中性的，在某些情况下，对经济价值的影响并不完全清楚。第4节显示了如何为这两种情况下，资本结构决策可以作为多准则决策问题，然后可以从中受益多准则决策支持工具，现在广泛使用的框架。 2。股东价值最大化
根据新古典主义的观点对公司的作用，该公司拥有一个单一的目标：股东价值最大化。股东拥有的公司的财产权利，因而有权决定公司的目标应该是什么。自股东只有一个目标铭记 - 财富最大化 - 该公司的目标是该公司的贡献，其股东财富的最大化。该公司可以完成这一投资项目正净现值值4。部分股东价值确定企业融资decision5。两个公司的资本结构理论 - 权衡理论与啄食顺序理论 - 假设股东财富最大化作为一个只有企业的目标。我们将讨论这两种理论，其中包括几个市场价值相关的扩展。这个讨论的基础上，我们制定的标准清单，这基本上是新古典主义的观点是企业融资决策有关。
原命题米勒和莫迪利安尼（1958）指出，在一个完美的资本市场，一个公司平衡市场价值是独立的资本结构，即债务权益比率6。如果我的主张不成立，那么套利将采取地方。投资者将购买被低估的公司股份，卖出高估股股份，在这样的方式，获得相同的收入来源。由于投资者利用这些套利机会，高估的股票价格将下降，被低估的股票会上涨，直到两个价格都是平等的。
当企业的税收介绍，我主张改变显着。米勒和莫迪利安尼（1958年，1963年）表明，在与世界企业所得税的企业的价值是AO的杠杆作用。当支付利息成为扣税，不向股东支付，公司价值最大化的资本结构，涉及到百分之百的债务融资。通过增加杠杆，政府支付的结果为
资本提供更高的现金流减少。 （GL）是由一个杠杆公司（谷）和相同的杠杆企业缴纳的税款现值之间的差额税盾（PVTS）的现值。图1描绘了一个无杠杆和杠杆firm7的总价值。高杠杆，低GL，高谷 - GL（= PVTS）的
在传统贸易的最优资本结构模型，它假设权衡财务困境或直接破产costs.9其他因素的边际直接成本，企业的边际利息税shields8现值可以包含在这个权衡框架。其他成本比金融危机的直接成本是代理成本詹森和麦克林（1976年）的债务。债务代理成本经常被引用的例子是投资不足问题（迈尔斯，1977年）10，资产替代问题（詹森和麦克林，1976年Galai和Masulis，1976），由经理游戏“播放时间”，“突发增加杠杆（相当于支付给股东，以使增加的影响相结合）“，”拒绝作出贡献股本“和”现金和运行的游戏（布雷利，迈尔斯和艾伦，2006年）。这些问题所造成的股票和债务持有人之间的利益差异，并可以作为金融危机的间接费用的一部分。债务的另一个好处是减少管理者之间的代理成本和外部股权（Jensen和Meckling，1976年，詹森，1986年，1989年）。詹森EN麦克林（1976）认为，债务，允许更大的管理剩余索取权，因为需要外部股权所使用的债务减少，增加管理工作的努力。此外，詹森（1986）认为，高杠杆率降低了自由现金流，用更少的资源，对无利可图的投资浪费，作为一个result.11之间的管理和外部股权的代理成本往往忽略了权衡理论，因为它假定管理者不采取行动，股东代表（只），这是一个传统的权衡理论假设。 迈尔斯（1984）和迈尔斯和麦吉罗夫（1984年）的啄食顺序model12有没有最佳的资本结构。相反，由于信息不对称和与外部financing13相关的信号问题，公司的融资政策遵循一个层次，为内部对外部融资，债务超过资产的偏好。这个模型的一个严格的解释表明，公司不瞄准目标负债比率。相反，资产负债率仅仅是随着时间的推移层次融资累积的结果。 （见Shyum破甲和迈尔斯，1999年）。原始信号模型的例子是罗斯（1977）和利兰和派尔（1977）的模型。罗斯（1977）表明，较高的财务杠杆，可以由管理人员使用的信号坚定乐观的未来，这些信号不能被模仿不成功firms14。利兰和派尔（1977）专注于业主，而不是经理。他们认为企业家有更好的预期现金流量的信息比外人。企业家举行内部信息可以转移到供应商的资金，是投资成功的项目中了他的财富的比例更大，因为它在雇主的利益。因此，所有者的投资意愿，在自己的项目，可以作为工程质量的信号。该公司的价值增加，相对的，他会在一个低质量的项目的情况下举行的百分比由企业家持有的股权比例。 （科普兰，韦斯顿和夏斯特里，2005年。）
Grinblatt和Titman（2002）15制定的利益相关者理论认为，坚定的和非财务利益相关者的互动方式，是一个公司的最优资本结构的重要因素。非财务利益相关者是那些债务和股权持有人以外的各方。非财务利益相关者，包括公司的客户，员工，供应商和整体社会在该公司的运作。这些利益相关者可以伤害一个公司的财政困难。例如客户可能会收到伪劣产品，是很难服务供应商可能会失去业务，员工可能会失去就业机会和经济可以被打乱。非财务利益相关者，因为他们可能在一家公司的财务危机事件承担的费用，将是不感兴趣的其他条件有高（ER）的潜在财政困难的公司开展业务的条件不变。这本无可厚非不愿做与悲痛公司的业务创建成本，可以阻止从一家公司承担过多的债务融资，即使贷款人愿意提供有利的条件（同上，598）。这些非财务利益相关者的考虑因素是其作为资本结构的决定因素的重要性的原因。这些利益相关者的影响，因为金融危机的间接费用，可以被看作是这个利益相关者理论权衡理论的一部分（布雷利，迈尔斯和艾伦，2006年，p.481，虽然没有被提及的“利益相关者理论”） 权衡理论（不包括经理和股东之间的代理成本）与啄食顺序理论，Grinblatt和Titman（2002）的利益相关者理论假设股东财富最大化作为单一的企业目标。
基于这些理论，已生产了大量的实证研究。例如见哈里斯和拉维夫（1991）系统地介绍了这个literature18。最近的研究是如shyum，破甲和Myers（1999），测试对啄食顺序理论，
权衡理论，Kemsley尼辛（2002）估算，安德拉德和卡普兰（1998年）的税盾的现值估计财务困境成本和Rajan＆津加莱斯（1995）调查的决定因素，在G-7国家的资本结构。拉詹和津加莱斯（1995）19说明在利用单个企业与企业特征的差异。在他们的研究利用的有形资产，市场功能，以账面价值比率，企业规模和盈利能力。巴克利和史密斯（1995）提供的企业债务期限的决定因素的实证检验。格雷厄姆和哈维（2001）调查有关a.o.392首席财务官资本结构。\\
交叉和韦塞尔斯Titman（1988），拉詹和津加莱斯（1995）和巴克利和史密斯（1995年）和沃尔德（1999）模型的主要杠杆的条款，然后作为一个功能不同的公司的杠杆资本结构的横断面研究（和市场）建议资本结构theory21特点。我们做相反的。我们不分析资本结构（CQ杠杆）的几个公司特征的影响，但我们分析资本结构的变量，共同确定股东价值的影响。在几项决定，其中包括资本结构的决定，这些变量可能会决定标准的作用。这是有关的权衡与啄食顺序理论的标准列于表1。我们将在第4节中更详细讨论这些准则。图2说明了我们的方法的基本思路。 3。其他的目标和注意事项
大量证据表明，管理者不仅股东的利益行事（见迈尔斯，2001年）。无论是静态权衡理论，也不是啄食顺序理论可以完全解释资本结构的差异。迈尔斯（2001年，第82页）指出，“然而，甚至40年后，莫迪利亚尼和米勒的研究，我们了解这些firms22融资选择是有限的。”多次调查结果（库尔斯1993年，格雷厄姆和哈维，2001年中，Brounen等。，2004）显示，首席财务官不交了很多注意在这些股东财富最大化的理论有关的变量。由于实证研究的结果，这并不令人感到惊讶。
由格雷厄姆和哈维的调查发现，只有温和权衡理论的证据。 70％左右，有一个灵活的目标或有点紧的目标或范围。只有10％，有严格的目标比例。大约20％的公司宣布，有一个最佳或目标的债务权益比率。 在一般情况下，企业所得税的优势似乎只有适度的资本结构决策中的重要。最重要的是大的调节和支付股息公司债务的税收优势。此外，有利的外汇相对于美国的税收待遇是相当重要的发行外债decisions23的。很少有证据被发现，个人所得税，影响资本structure24。金融危机的潜在成本，一般似乎不是很重要，虽然信贷评级。根据格雷厄姆和哈维这最后的调查结果可以看作是（间接）与遇险的关注迹象。盈利波动也似乎是一个杠杆的决定性因素，这是一致的预测，企业破产的概率是降低杠杆高。公司不声明直接（目前预期值）的财务困境成本是资本结构的重要因素，虽然间接证据似乎存在。格雷厄姆和哈维发现没有证据表明，通过增加杠杆，企业自律经理。格雷厄姆和哈维明确注意，'1）经理可能是不愿意承认使用这种方式的债务，或2）也许1关于这个问题的低评级反映1的企业不愿意要采取比Jensen的说法“的弱点Jensen的解决方案。
最重要的问题，影响企业债务的决定，是管理的财务灵活性的愿望（债务能力的过剩现金或保存）。此外，管理者都不愿意发行普通股股票时，他们认为市场被低估（大多数首席财务官认为他们的股票价值被低估）。由于信息不对称的变量有没有权力来预测新的债务或股权的问题，哈维和格雷厄姆结束，啄食顺序模型是不是真正的安全choice25模型。
新古典模型不（完全）解释金融行为的事实可以解释在几个方面。首先，它可能是经理人努力为股东创造价值，但同时也要注意表1中列出的变量以外的变量。其中的经理认为他们（理直气壮）为股东创造价值的相关的变量。其次，它可能是管理者不（只）作为well26股东，但对其他利益相关者的利益。因此，整合经理，他们或其他利益相关者在管理公司的资本结构的过程中有关的变量。这些变量的融资决策的影响，是不是每个股东价值的定义为负。例如如果经理的财务奖励价值'是一个经理最大化的目标 - 这可能不能排除 - 如果经理人的奖励包括一个看涨期权的很大一部分，管理者可以决定增加杠杆（和支付的现金过量，
如果有的话）杠杆波动的股票期权的价值，因此增加。杠杆的增加可能有积极的影响对股东财富（如股权和管理之间的代理成本可能更低），但财政奖励标准值“可以（但不必）是领先的。第三，股东，本身就可能有其他比股东创造财富的目标。第四，管理者依靠一定的（不同的）拇指或不损害股东价值的启发式规则，但不能由either27新古典模型解释。第五，新古典模型是不完整或不正确测试（见如Shyum破甲和迈尔斯，1999年）。 无论哪种方式，我们不期望比在新古典主义的财产权利的观点成立的其他变量或应明确包括在融资决策框架。为了确定哪些变量应该包括我们可能需要的其他意见或比单独的新古典主义理论的坚定。津加莱斯（2000）认为“...公司财务理论，实证研究，实际意义和政策建议，都深深植根于一个坚定的基础理论。”（同上，第1623号）。尝试新的理论的例子是“公司的利益相关者理论“（见如唐纳森和普雷斯顿，1995年），”开明的利益相关者理论“作为响应（见詹森，2001），”组织理论“（见迈尔斯，1993年，2000年，2001年）和利益相关者的权益模型。
我们引入一个组织的资产负债表，这是基于对迈尔斯（1993）组织理论。其目的是提供一个框架，以加强有关标准，可以为企业不同利益相关者有关的讨论。在迈尔斯的组织理论的员工（包括经理）作为利益相关者，我们作为供应商，客户和社会各界以及其他利益相关者整合。
税前价值是公司的最大价值，包括目前所有利益相关者的剩余价值的最大价值。目前的利益相关者的剩余价值（ES加OTS）的是对未来的福利费用的现值，人浮于事以上的投入（包括高于市场的工资）的市场价格，高于市场服务提供给客户和社会etc.28根据税前价值的企业理论，可以分布在不同的利益相关者遵循一定的“规则”。请注意，就是我们所说的“过剩”，在此框架内仍然对“产权”的坚定原则为基础。其次，在市场价值的唯一分布在这个资产负债表中反映。中性突变not29。
格雷厄姆和Harvey（2001）和常识的结果的基础上，我们制订标准，可分为融资决策框架集成启发式的名单。一些准则，导致中性突变别人不要。我们呼吁这些标准的“准非经济准则”。非经济的，因为标准并非基于新古典主义的观点。准，因为具有经济价值的关系并不总是明确的。我们包括中性突变导致的，因为经理可能有很好的理由，我们忽视或金融财富比其他原因的有关标准。
我们在本文提出的最广泛的决策框架是一个包括经济和准非经济变量。图4说明了主意。表2列出了额外的准非经济变数。这份清单还远远没有完成。
灵活性可能是最少的员工，并为这些项目所需要的资源供应商有关。只要作为管理者，只有将投资于零的净现值项目，这个变量会组织的资产负债表中有没有价值的影响。但是，如果它影响开展项目的总和的价值，这将反映在此资产负债表。
破产概率影响的员工和“有利可图”与企业的关系，供应商，客户和社会的持续时间，作业安全。对于经理（和其他利益相关者没有多元化的投资组合）的违约概率可能是重要的。破产费用是对他们可能比股东多元化的投资组合。违约概率与财务上的灵活性，以及对股东价值的影响。在第2和4中，我们讨论这个变量，在关系到股东价值。这里的变量是相关的，因为它有一个财富或其他“价值”利益相关者的权益（债务）持有人以外的变量的影响。我们假设所有者经理不喜欢与他人分享他们的公司的控制。出于这个原因，债务融资可能有非经济的优势，这些经理。毕竟，进行普通股的投票权，而债务不。所有者经理可能更喜欢较新的股权的债务，以保持对公司的控制权。在经济框架以及相关的控制，请参阅第2和4。 在实践中，盈利构成摊薄影响融资决策是一个重要的变量。无论是中性突变的变量或not30对每股收益的影响，融资决策往往是一些重要的。如果在减少每股盈利（EPS）的被认为是一个不好的信号，经理试图阻止这种减少。因此，对EPS的影响成为一个经济变量。只要它是一个中性突变变量，或如果是其他原因，我们把EPS作为一个准的非经济变量有关。
奖励包，可能是有关雇员。如果融资决策的影响这个包的价值，这个变量将是经理的相关标准之一。如果有可能，以增加这个包的价值，对股东价值的影响是其他条件不变负。如果奖励计划激励经理创建额外的股东价值与无包的情况相比，这将可能超过抵消这种消极的融资效果。
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